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Abstract
Drones face two main concerns: safety and security/privacy. Whilst safety has been broadly studied by literature, less
research has been carried out into security/privacy. Moreover, current European regulations on drone flights apply to
outdoor drones but not always to their indoor counterparts. However, several industrial sectors have started to use
drones for indoor tasks such as surveillance, architecture, emergencies, and communication media. A qualitative study
has been conducted in order to explore the concerns expressed by civil drone operators over the measures that
manufacturers include in their products and information packages. Codes of conduct could also help these parties when
there is no legal regulation that can be applied. We used content analysis as the method of analysis for three different
sources: secondary data from a literature review and from public European documents, and primary data from focus
groups. Results show that safety and security/privacy by design are seen as the best ethical measures, whilst codes of
conduct could be used as complimentary information for professional users.
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Introduction
Drones, also known as RPAS (remotely piloted aircraft
systems), UAS (unmanned aircraft systems) and UAV
(unmanned aerial vehicles), are attracting the attention
of many researchers. Over the last few years, the tech-
nological advances made in drones have enabled man-
ufacturers to market them to all audiences, not only for
professional but also for private use. Drones are used
in different sectors such as heritage, topography,
inspections, surveillance, security, agriculture, fishing,
media, emergencies, transport, communications,
and defence.
A search of the keyword “drone” on the Web of
Science (Thompson Reuters) has yielded around 3000
results over the last fifteen years, with numbers rising
particularly sharply over the last four years. The major-
ity of these results are related to the “Science/
Engineering” field.
This shows that drones have become very popular
very quickly. However, there is often a legal vacuum
when this occurs with a particular product. In addition,
there are many different concerns about the use of
drones, including their impact on the environment
(especially noise)1 as well as on people (safety) and
on people’s personal data (security and privacy).2
Drones can be equipped, for example, with high-
resolution cameras, microphones, thermal imaging or
the capacity to intercept wireless communications.3
Juul,4 for example, highlights that the current regu-
latory system in Europe is based on fragmented rules,
with many Member States regulating some aspects of
civil drones (operating mass of 150 kg or less), and the
responsibility for civil drones over 150 kg being left to
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
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Moreover, Fox5 points out that the EU has recognised
that it is not prepared and does not have a suitable
framework in place to meet the existing challenges
and potential opportunities of this new era of
unmanned flight.
The European Council considers the EASA to be
the best placed authority to develop technical and
safety standards, licences and certificates. Since 2015,
the EASA6 has suggested modifying legal regulations in
order to create a European regulation for civil drones.
It has proposed several categories and standards, but
indoor drones are not included in them, unless we inter-
pret them as being included in an “open” category.7
Anyway, at present, even if the European Parliament
has opened the door to a common European frame-
work and regulation, irrespective of what the drone
weighs, the regulation still only applies to outdoor
drones as it is based on the “Single European Sky air-
space”.8 Therefore, on many occasions, the only solu-
tion for drones used indoors, which is considered as a
private space, is ethics.
In general terms, measures regarding safety and pri-
vacy should take into account the following three
main scenarios:
1. Injury to operators due to their constant proximity
to RPAS.
2. Injury to the public or invasion of their privacy (per-
sonal data). This could refer to an audience of
observers, or passers-by who are unaware of
drone activity.
3. General damage to property. This includes the
indoor surroundings in which the RPAS are flying
as well as damage to the actual RPAS.
Moreover, in the case of indoor drones, a flight
permit is not always required. In the majority of
European countries, this depends solely on the proper-
ty owner giving permission, for example, in the UK,
permission is required when professional work using
drones is performed. Nevertheless, although outdoor
micro-drones, in general, i.e. those which have less
than 500 g maximum take-off mass,9 and indoor
drones do not need special licences, professional oper-
ators have to ensure they are covered (insurance for
persons/properties).
According to Clarke,10 there is a risk that manufac-
turers and operators may neglect safety considerations,
especially in the mini-drones segment. Drone costs
have fallen sharply, particularly in the case of micro-
drones for the consumer market, and competition
among producers and operators can result in unethical
behaviour, although drone manufacturers have to
comply with different standards.11 For example, all
drones have to have an identification number.
Requiring operators to be licensed and have insurance
can impose standards and ensure safety.12
Nevertheless, apart from safety, other regulations
regarding privacy, self-image13 and data protection
can affect the use of indoor drones. The European
Parliament’s Transport and Tourism Committee also
emphasises safety, privacy, security and data
protection.4
The former Article 29 Working Party14 asked
producers to help out by providing advice on their
packaging and using codes of conduct in order to
self-regulate the industry. Other tools, like impact
assessment and the participation of a Data Protection
Officer appointed by the data controller, could increase
customer trust. It would be positive if industry could
react proactively when regulation is not sufficient.
Some associations made up of drone manufacturers
and operators have developed codes of conduct and
apply ethical rules to their work.15 What these codes
do is provide guidance to regulators of legal standards
and practices that are in force.16 For example, in the
European Union, ARPAS-UK has its own code of
conduct.17 As drone technology is changing fast, new
organisations’ adoption of drone technologies must be
paired with clear articulations of their ethical use and
full transparency with the public.18
Yet critics argue that these codes have the limita-
tions of any industry’s attempt to self-regulate: there
are no significant consequences when the code is
broken. Therefore, some authors add the need for co-
regulation in conjunction with government19 as well as
additional training for users.11
Consequently, interaction among stakeholders may
produce a consensus in terms of a public policy
approach in an area where there is considerable uncer-
tainty.14 In this case, we have focused on the activity of
manufacturers when designing indoor drones and the
activity of operators and pilots when using them in
order to analyse which features and measures will
add proactive, safe and secure use for these new
unmanned aircraft.
Existing safety technology
According to the literature, safety concerns include dis-
turbance, no direct line of sight, loss of communica-
tion, loss of control, loss of positioning system, and
low batteries. It normally associates two types of
actors, manufacturers and operators, with safety.
Technically speaking, these two parties have to take
into account very similar safety measures for design
and for operations.
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Manufacturers
Clarke10 remarks that the term “airworthiness” is used
to refer to an aircraft’s suitability for safe flight. For
example, an aircraft’s altitude represents its orientation
around its centre of gravity in three dimensions: roll or
bank (rotation around the aircraft’s long axis), pitch
(rise and fall of the nose of the aircraft), and yaw or
heading (port-starboard/left-right swing of the nose of
the aircraft).
Safety tests, which should check different key attrib-
utes of the product, are necessary before a drone can be
marketed.10 They include:
• Awareness of the drone’s location within the opera-
tional space, of its altitude and of its direction and
speed of movement.
• Sensors and/or remote data-feeds that enable the
awareness of location, altitude and movement to
be maintained in a sufficiently timely manner.
• A sufficient set of controls over the drone’s altitude,
direction and speed, to enable flight to be sustained
under a wide variety of atmospheric conditions (this
does not apply indoors). That is, to have an auto-
mated stabiliser in order to prevent crashes.
• Sufficient rapid response of the drone to the controls
(manoeuvrability).
• Sufficient power (batteries or whatever source of
energy) to maintain movement, to implement the
controls, and to operate sensors and data-feeds,
for the duration of the flight.
• The ability to navigate to destination locations
within the operational space.
• The ability to monitor the operational space (situa-
tional awareness, threat detection).
• The ability to navigate with respect to obstacles (col-
lision avoidance).
• Sufficient physical robustness to withstand threaten-
ing events, such as wind-shear, turbulence, lightning
and bird-strike (this does not apply indoors).
Moreover, existing safety measures on RPAS can be
subdivided into active and passive types. Whilst active
measures try to detect possible risks to prevent them
from happening, passive measures try to mitigate the
impact of accidents through the features of RPAS.
Some active measures that can be applied in any
environment are:
• A redundant flight control system, which keeps the
drone stable even if there is a failure in the primary
flight system. Motor propulsion units, a battery and
a central unit are critical elements that must be
redundant to compensate for a possible failure on
a multirotor.
• Failsafe is a pre-programmed behaviour designed to
prevent a crash in the event of an unsafe situation.
The RPAS either lands automatically or returns to
its launch base. Many drones feature this safety
device to allow them to abandon a pre-planned mis-
sion and return to a landing point directly if they
experience any problems.20
• Flight stabilisation through an integrated position-
ing system. A GPS (global positioning system) is the
most commonly used positioning system outdoors,
but it can also be applied to cellular network posi-
tioning to calculate a position via an observed time
difference from two different base transceiver sta-
tions to a mobile station. In indoor situations,
visual positioning systems (VPS) are the most
commonly used. However, even though indoor posi-
tioning systems have made great progress, most of
the new technologies have not been specifically
developed for use with RPAS. To date, only a few
commercial RPAS, such as Inspire and Phantom by
DJI and Rolling Spider by Parrot, claim to incorpo-
rate an indoor VPS. Unfortunately, there are several
problems with VPS when used in confined spaces, as
they are light sensitive, sensitive to different surface
textures and also have height limitations. In addi-
tion, no extra safety measures (e.g. redundant
flight control system, proximity sensors) have been
added to these indoor drones.
Furthermore, other active measures that exist for
outdoor RPAS, such as geo-fencing (virtual perimeter
or no-fly zones, which require a reconstruction of the
environment) and flight path programming (automated
flights), are currently absent in indoor environments.
These measures define a set of vital data and test meth-
ods to help machine designers and manufacturers
achieve a suitable safety level for the new human-
machine collaborative working situation.21
Passive measures include rotor protection, reduced
weight and an absence of sharp edges.
Operators
The use of an RPAS close to people always involves a
certain level of risk. This is generally low as these devi-
ces are usually used outdoors. Being pilotless, drones
can be more vulnerable to crashing and accidents might
injure people on the ground. Rotary wing devices may
be more dangerous in cases of engine failure as they
tend to fall vertically.18
That is, small mistakes could result in crashes that
threaten the health, well-being and property of the
public22 and experience is supposed to be the best
way to reduce risks. Training is essential to drone oper-
ation, and is part of safety.12
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In addition, the chance of a human piloting error
leading to an accident could be eliminated in some
cases if there was an auto-pilot function. Training a
pilot requires time and dedication and an experienced
pilot could input the routes needed during filming or
for a photo shoot indoors.
Security and privacy concerns
Fundamental rights such as privacy, self-image and data
protection can be affected by drone’ operations.13
Information security deals with measures designed to
protect information and information systems from
unauthorised access, use, disclosure, disruption, modi-
fication, perusal, inspection, recording or destruction.23
Some security concerns include hacking, hijacking, and
cyber-attacks. Therefore, from a manufacturer’s point
of view, communications between devices need to be
encrypted to permit secure computer–RPAS communi-
cation and prevent unauthorised access by third parties.
On the other hand, privacy concerns relate to the
recording and processing of personal data such as
images, geolocalisation and electromagnetic signals,
because a drone can attach a camera to record data
and subsequently process it.
From the viewpoint of an operator and of compa-
nies that could work with them, data protection is
guaranteed by the European Union. The Data
Protection Law Enforcement Directive24 (whenever
personal data is used by criminal law enforcement
authorities) and the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR),25 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data, guarantee
the rights of access, rectification, deletion and blocking.
However, in order to correctly apply the standards, the
subjects must be informed. There are easier ways to do
this indoors, by using tickets, posters and individual
authorisations. In addition, the necessary storage meas-
ures should be applied when processing this data,
according to the GDPR.
Security and privacy by design could also be a solu-
tion for more ethical use of drones.26 For example, data
can be made anonymous (such as pixelating images to
avoid facial recognition).27
Method
To collect the necessary data, we applied a triangula-
tion process,28 using multiple data sources. Our sources
of information included secondary data from our liter-
ature review and public documents from the European
Union as well as primary data from focus groups
with experts.
Scopus literature review
We performed a literature review using the Scopus
database to check how the three topics of safety–secu-
rity–privacy were related. When we searched for the
following keywords (RPAs OR drones AND security
OR safety OR privacy) an excessive number of docu-
ments (564) were returned, therefore we decided to
limit the search. As we noticed that privacy was the
least studied topic, although all the works were focused
on the three topics, we restricted our search as follows:
TITLE-ABS-KEY (rpas OR drones AND privacy)
AND (EXCLUDE (AU-ID, “Undefined” undefined))
AND (LIMIT-TO (DOCTYPE, “ar”) OR LIMIT-TO
(DOCTYPE, “cp”) )
Through this search, we were able to limit the papers to
journals and conference papers. We also removed all
the documents without a clear author. After filtering
the duplicated results, the results yielded 59 papers that
were specifically focused on safety, security and privacy
issues with drones.
As Figure 1 shows, the number of papers has
increased significantly over the last few years, which
demonstrates that this is a trending topic. However,
the majority of studies are based in the USA whilst in
the European Union, Germany and the United
Kingdom are the two most relevant countries working
on these topics (Figure 2).
In relation to the field of study, though Computer
Science and Engineering cover 76% of the papers (indi-
vidually or together with other fields), we can observe
that 61% are related to Social Sciences plus Business.
This means that it is also a relevant topic from the
point of view of firms and stakeholders (Figure 3).
Anyway, although Scopus is a broader database than
others, we have to take into account that not all the
journals are included in it, i.e. some Law journals do
not appear. However, we preferred to analyse the topic
in a homogeneous way using a single database.
Furthermore, we analysed the co-occurrences
among the three topics to find out the main areas stud-
ied by the literature. To achieve this objective, we used
the VOSviewer software,29 which displays this informa-
tion with different figures.
In the first one (Figure 4), we can see the co-
occurrences between the keywords. “The colour of an
item is determined by the cluster to which the item
belongs”.29 In this case, four groups were formed:
one related to safety, one related to security/data
protection, one related to data in general and the
last one related to surveillance. The lines indicate the
strongest co-occurrence links between words. Safety
is mainly related to the design of the drone; security
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and data protection are related to the impact on
people; surveillance is a specific topic in itself as it is
the most closely analysed sector in terms of these topics
and generates the greatest concerns about its regula-
tion,30 whilst data in general is a keyword related to
all of them.
An analysis of the density figure (Figure 5) was sim-
ilar. In this case,
each point in a map has a colour that depends on the
density of items at that point. . . The larger the number
of items in the neighbourhood of a point and the higher
the weights of the neighbouring items, the closer the
colour of the point is to red.29
European documents: Regulations and statistics
As mentioned in Introduction section, the European
Union and other related bodies have drawn up a series
of documents in order to clarify the regulation of civil
drones although no common legislation has yet been
approved. Many documents were published in 2015,
yet three years later the situation remains the same
although it seems a specific regulation could come into
force by 2019. The main documents analysed are:
The Riga Declaration on Remotely Piloted
Aircraft (drones).31
Opinion 01/2015 on Privacy and Data Protection
Issues relating to the Utilisation of Drones.14
Figure 2. Analysis by countries using the Scopus database (Elsevier).
Figure 1. Yearly analysis using the Scopus database (Elsevier).
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Figure 3. Analysis by field of study using the Scopus database (Elsevier).
Figure 4. Co-occurrences among keywords with VOSviewer.
Figure 5. Density among keywords with VOSviewer.
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Introduction of a regulatory framework for the opera-
tion of drones.6
Introduction of a regulatory framework for the opera-
tion of UAS in the “open” and “specific” categories.7
Civil drones in the European Union.4
Common rules in the field of civil aviation and the
European Union Aviation Safety Agency.8
Moreover, we also analysed new data protection
regulations that are set to replace the existing regime:
Directive 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of
the Council, of 27 April 2016.24 From 5 May 2018, this
is directly binding for data controllers in all member
states therefore the lack of transposition could be a
problem for citizens’ rights.
Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and
of the Council, Of 27 April 2016.25 This Regulation
contains measures that would harmonise data protec-
tion procedures and enforcement across the EU and it
is applied from 25 May 2018.
The second source of data analysed were statistics from
the European Union database Statista. In this data-
base, we found different statistics from the United
Kingdom compiled by ComRes in May 2016 (2043
respondents aged 18 and older).
The first one centred on the safety of drones
and conventional aircrafts in the United Kingdom
(Figure 6). This question was phrased by the source
as follows: “To what extent, if at all, do you agree or
disagree with each of the following statements? Drones
pose more of a safety risk than radio-controlled aircraft
which have been around for years.” 58 percent of the
respondents tended to or strongly agreed that drones
posed a greater safety risk than conventional aircrafts.
In the case of privacy, the next statistics show the
share of respondents who are concerned about privacy
matters because of the use of drones in the United
Kingdom (Figure 7). This question was phrased by
the source as follows: “Thinking of all the potential
uses of drones previously mentioned, to what extent,
if at all, are you concerned or otherwise about their
usage for any of the following reasons? Privacy (e.g.
being spied on at home)”. Forty two percent of the
respondents stated that they were very concerned
about their privacy.
The last one shows the evaluation of the respondents
in terms of the commercial sensitivity and private
use of drones in the United Kingdom (Figure 8). This
question was phrased by the source as follows:
“To what extent, if at all, do you agree or disagree
with each of the following statements? I am less wor-
ried about the commercial sensitivity use of drones
than private use of drones.” Forty eight percent
of the respondents tended to agree that they are less
worried about commercial applications of drones than
that of private use. An additional 14 percent agreed
strongly with this statement. That is, people place
greater trust in professionals using drones than in the
general public.
In general, the impressions of these citizens regard-
ing safety, security and privacy, are in accordance with
the results of Boucher.32
Figure 6. Drones pose more of a safety risk than radio-controlled aircraft which have been around for years?
Source: www.statista.com/statistics/606635/uk-drones-safety-risks/
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Focus groups
In February 2017, we conducted focus groups in three
European countries (Belgium, United Kingdom and
Spain) in order to explore the concerns of the industry
about safety and security related to drones. Each group
was formed by six-seven expert informants from differ-
ent sectors. Half of them had a drone pilot’s licence.
Based on the literature review, we compiled a guide to
Figure 7. To what extent, if at all, are you concerned or otherwise about their usage for any of the following reasons? Privacy (e.g.
being spied on at home).
Source: www.statista.com/statistics/606319/privacy-concerns-and-use-of-drones-uk/
Figure 8. To what extent, if at all, do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? I am less worried about the
commercial sensitivity use of drones than private use of drones.
Source: www.statista.com/statistics/606362/commercial-sensitivity-and-use-of-drones-uk/
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conduct the focus groups on the key topics and we
acted as facilitators of the dynamics.
First of all, we gave the informants an agreement
form to sign so we could record their voice and
image, in line with the data protection legislation in
force in each country. Their names and affiliation
remained anonymous.
Then, in each focus group, we held a two-hour con-
versation about the following: safety measures (preven-
tion of accidents), security and privacy issues
(protection from unauthorised access by third-parties)
and ethical issues.
Finally, we transcribed the audio content of the
three focus groups from the 20 informants, including
6 hours of recordings, 180 hours of transcription,
almost 50,000 words and more than 100 pages to ana-
lyse. The main document enabled us to perform a con-
tent analysis of the principal issues.
Results from primary data
The information from the focus groups enabled us to
explore the possible concerns of operators when flying
an indoor drone, even if there is no applica-
ble regulation.
Following the previous analysis, we separated safety
and security concerns. However, in general, all the
informants agreed that safety by design and security
by design are the best solution for all the concerns,
because “If it’s very accurate and it works very well
then it will be more ethical” (Belgian informant).
Maybe if there’s a point when, without doubt, the sen-
sors work perfectly, we know there’s no error margin,
it’s very easy to use and in case of any problem it lands
without crashing on anything. . . if all of these are thor-
oughly tested, we could reach a point when anyone
could use a drone. (Spanish informant)
Moreover, because indoor drones “do not need a pilot
or a licence, anyway it’s always a good idea for the
owner to have insurance”, even though “the regulation
doesn’t apply”. However, this situation sometimes cre-
ates an unsafe environment: “The main problem is
always the legal vacuum, depending where you fly
you’re afraid of what might happen and sometimes
we are stopped when we’re recording something”
(Spanish informants).
Safety
We can also separate safety by design (manufacturer)
and safety during the flight (operator).
Regarding drone manufacture, informants agreed
that safety by design can reduce incidents. As an
informant from Belgium said, “something that is
‘uncrashable’ because it detects everything”. In terms
of indoor drones, “safety first in this case. And it has to
be as easy to use as possible. And small”
(Belgian informant).
For example, in the case of outdoor drones, DJI
drones shut down when approaching an airport,
“that’s built in to the drone by the manufacturer or
via a firmware update” (UK informant).
The key elements that an indoor drone should have
in its design, according to the informants, are
the following:
a. Active elements:
“Much larger batteries that last longer” (UK infor-
mant).
Speed control: “flying very smoothly, slowly indoors
because twitchiness and things like that can be. . . a
pain” (UK informant).
“Flying home. . .the drone works. . . and then
returns” (Spanish informant).
“Not to lose the connection with the
pilot. . .antennas should be fixed to ensure communi-
cation is maintained” (Spanish informant).
Positioning system: sensors (“infrared . . . and also
sound. . . sonar”) to prevent crashes (Belgian infor-
mant). “A safety margin, a safety border, not phys-
ical, with sensors, to avoid the drone getting too
close to works” (Spanish informant). “Indoors
your margin of error is even smaller” (UK infor-
mant), so “Safety is a main thing. When you put a
camera that has cost f50,000–60,000 in the air you
want it to return to the ground in one piece, and
that’s the main thing, . . . you have sensors every-
where” (Belgian informant). “Sensors. . . would
seem to be the most practical and easiest solution
in my opinion to prevent indoor collisions. A
visual system that you have to look at to see how
far away you are distracts you from the position of
the drone. You can see that you can’t rely on the
valid, sorry inaccurate, indoor positioning system
such as the GPS that you use outdoors” (UK infor-
mant). “Drone development is also already making
more sensors around the drone, in the drone, inside
the drone” . . . “sudden obstacles are still a weak
point” (Belgian informant). Other: “then you could
fly really, really close to anything and as soon as you
touch something with the things they can instantly
correct their position and back off a little bit”.
b. Passive elements:
“Prop guards can be really handy” (UK informant).
“Weight is also an important factor. The lighter the
drone the better, if it crashes on something”
(Spanish informant).
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From the operators’ viewpoint, informants think
that for a professional “reputation is everything” and
“loyalty is a huge thing” (UK informant), so they avoid
taking risks with a wick product or flying a drone with-
out experience. But they worry about the unprepared
competition: “Think of all the other people that say
they can do it. Probably illegally” (UK informant).
I think there are lot of people who say ‘I am a drone
operator’ and they may well go with an old one, and
they may have read the manual, but actually they don’t
know fully what they’re doing. There are a lot of. . . a
lot of amateurs out there and I worry about the safety
of it. (UK informant)
I think the only thing that doesn’t exist is the reliability
and the safety of the drone because now the market is
like everybody buys a drone but not everybody can fly
one so when it is really easy to use that would be a
point in its favour. (Belgian informant)
To avoid professional interference, “I will. . .ask for
a licence and total control. . .you can’t take the risk
. . . a licence and training. . .You are going to want to
ask for the pilot’s CV if you are going to out him/her in
a special place” (Spanish informant). In addition, “the
first thing you would obviously ask for is their licence,
proof of insurance, the indemnity insurance they have,
etc. Then you would ask. . . to see the portfolio of the
pilot” (UK informant).
Experience brings trust because, even if legal regu-
lations do not require a licence to fly a drone indoors, if
you have a
qualified drone pilot with civil aviation authority. . .you
get your approval or licence . . . The other thing is
“The course’s objective is not to teach you how to
fly. . . The main focus is safety, navigation, rules, regu-
lations, where you can or can’t fly, how far you need to
be away from. . . extras, personnel. So, for anyone
who’s got their licence. . ., their number one priority
. . . certainly should be safety.” (UK informant)
Professionals pay attention to other things, such as
making the operator visible, requests for authorisations
and having insurance coverage. “I worry about the
insurance side of risks: you know, the equipment get-
ting broken, somebody getting hurt. . .” (UK infor-
mant). If you automate the flight, “Now you don’t
need two people, . . . you only need one person”
(Belgian informant). “In an indoor setting, you’re far
more capable of delivering what your vision is”,
“someone’s always got their eye on the drone while
someone else might be monitoring” (UK informant).
But. . . “something else can always happen. You have
to anticipate; you have to be able to anticipate. That’s
when the creativity also kicks in and if everything is too
automated, you’re limited in those terms”
(Belgian informant).
Another comment was that producers could give
advice and instructions. For example, “YouTube
videos of five minutes each, or some random software,
without putting money into it” (UK informant).
Security and privacy
All the informants agreed that security/privacy by
design can prevent risks. For example, device authen-
tication can prevent unauthorised connections. A key
measure for security is to protect the Wi-Fi connection,
as “A big, massive Wi-Fi booster in a big exhibition
hall would come across and. . . that has the potential to
knock out your remote-control link” (UK informant).
The hijacking of drones should be a big focus in the
future. Hijacking a drone next to a football stadium,
for example, could encourage using the drone to drop
something or do something it shouldn’t be doing.
That’s quite a big concern. (UK informant)
In terms of privacy, “if you speak to people who are
and aren’t familiar with drones. . . then what’s their
number one prior. . .number one worry is their privacy:
flying over parks, kids etc.” (UK informant). Concerns
are related to when a camera is fixed to the drone:
“Privacy issues. . ., are related to the camera you use.
Not to the use of the drone. It’s just camera use”
(Belgian informant). Moreover, because the massive
idea is related to bad news, so when people see a
drone they say “Stay away from there!. . . Sometimes
you have so many people coming up to tell us” (UK
informant). A first measure would be to identify who
the drone operator is “especially when they’re unethical
about it and that’s trouble” (UK informant). But, in
addition to a camera, other devices such as micro-
phones and thermal imaging can also be used.
Moreover, asking for permission or at least giving
the necessary information can prevent trouble or hours
of editing. “If there are people in your recording, or
they sign to give you permission or you have to delete
their faces” (Spanish informant).
Conclusions
This work adds a twofold view to the literature. On one
hand, it gives a new perspective to the study of safety
and security elements of drones. Traditionally, agencies
distinguish between active and passive technical
measures. However, we have distinguished between
measures according to the actor who is involved.
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From our point of view, manufacturers and operators
are different actors. Although they both should have
the same knowledge on safety risks and measures, man-
ufacturers are key actors as they can actually develop
these measures whilst operators can only use them, so
they are less involved in the design of the product.
However, manufacturers should work together with
operators in order to improve these measures. We
observed that knowledge of operators’ concerns can
add considerable value to the product, especially in
the case of SMEs that have to compete with powerful
firms like DJI.
On the other hand, literature has paid more atten-
tion to the safety side of drones rather than to security
and privacy concerns. However, this is mainly an eth-
ical issue that policymakers should work on with stake-
holders,33 especially in the case of micro-drones and
indoor drones that do not require a flight licence or
training to be used.
Participants give importance to the experience of the
pilot, and even more so, when dealing with professional
jobs. Trust is generated when a pilot has been trained
and there is also insurance to cover any eventuality.
Protecting the Wi-Fi connection is also a must in all
the cases to give information to the subjects
when recording.
The results show that, although ethics and codes
of conduct can help drone users, co-regulation
in which public agencies could provide some kind of
certificate would be a beneficial addition to reinforce
other kinds of uses where flight licences are
not compulsory.
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